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1Do citizens hold mayors accountable for 
local conditions? Evidence from Italian 
municipalities
Abstract
Using data on 75 big Italian municipalities between 2010 and 2015, this paper looks at the 
extent to which citizens' evaluations of mayors are responsive to changes in local 
performance indicators. While local economic and crime measures are found not be 
associated with mayoral approval ratings, there is a correlation between mayors’ popularity 
and indicators for local public transportation and air quality. Mayors of municipalities where 
more individuals use public transport and where there is less polluted air enjoy higher 
approval ratings. Additional analysis shows that this result is driven by very big 
municipalities (with a population over 500,000) that are more likely to be exposed to high 
levels of traffic congestion and pollution. 
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2Accountability is often considered to be a crucial element of a functioning democracy 
(D’Angelo, King, and Ranalli 2017). Elections are the channel through which the public 
punishes policy makers who did not deliver on their promises and rewards those who did 
(Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Sweeting 2012). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the 
accountability mechanism is questionable (Hay 2007; Stoker 2010) as there are several 
problems (including, for example, poor information among the public and lack of clarity as 
to individual functional responsibility) that make it not easy for citizens to monitor the 
performance in office of political leaders. 
While there is an extensive literature on retrospective voting at the national level, there are far 
fewer studies looking at how accountability works in local government. This is, however, 
unfortunate since the large majority of elected officials serve at the local level and their 
actions have more tangible and immediate consequences on citizens’ daily life than measures 
taken at state (region) or national levels.  For instance, local governments are responsible for 
delivering several public services including transportation, police protection, and trash 
removal. If residents are happy with these services, we would expect them to reward local 
politicians. If, by contrast, voters are unsatisfied, it is possible that the popularity of local 
political leaders will decrease.  
In this paper, we use 6 years of data for 75 big Italian municipalities to investigate how much 
citizens’ evaluations of mayors are responsive to changes in local conditions. Our work 
attempts to contribute to and expand on previous research in four main ways. First, while a 
lot of studies (see, among others, Balaguer-Call et al. 2015; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2008) 
are based on electoral outcomes (e.g. the probability of an incumbent mayor being re-
elected), we rely on approval ratings observed at regular intervals throughout a mayor’s time 
3in office. In order to investigate how citizens’ evaluations of mayors respond over time to 
changes in local conditions, it may be important to use a time-continuous approval measure 
rather than an indicator that is only available every few years. Second, we study the 
relationship between mayoral approval and the provision of several salient public services 
clearly falling under the direct control of the local government1. Whereas most existing 
studies look at how economic and crime conditions affect mayors’ approval ratings (see 
McCabe et al. 2008 and many references thereafter), the quality of the delivery of public 
goods may also be an important factor shaping people’s opinions about the mayors’ 
performance. Third, in contrast to many earlier papers (see, among others, Dickerson 2016; 
Kinder and Kiewiet 1979) we use objective rather than subjective measures of performance. 
In our analysis it is assumed that citizens evaluate mayors not on the basis of their 
perceptions of local conditions, but according to actual local performance indicators. As 
argued earlier, this approach hinges on the idea that the activities of the local government are 
visible to people’s eyes in the course of their day-to-day life. Fourth, we focus on Italy. 
Works on the US tend to dominate the empirical literature in this field, and whilst these 
studies are instructive, it would be rather hazardous to make inferences exclusively based on 
them. Additionally, Italy is an interesting country to look at since in the last twenty years has 
undertaken important institutional reforms granting more power and responsibility to lower 
levels of government (Baldini and Baldi 2014). Such a process is likely to have made local 
representatives more accountable to citizens. A few studies seem in fact to support this 
conclusion. Bianchini and Revelli (2013) examine the environmental accountability of local 
Italian policy makers. Using data on municipal elections in a number of major cities, they 
find that local environmental performance has a statistically significant effect on the 
popularity of the incumbent. Burroni, Piselli and Ramella (2009) observe that in Italy there is 
4a high correlation between mayor approval rating and experts’ evaluation of the effectiveness 
of several public services and goods in a city. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next Section we briefly review the 
results of some studies that investigate factors affecting the electoral success or popularity of 
local political leaders. Then we describe the variables, data and methods employed, followed 
by empirical results. Finally, we discuss the findings and the implications of our results.
Determinants of local political leaders’ electoral success/popularity
A relatively large body of literature examine the factors determining the electoral success or 
popularity of local political leaders. The majority of the existing studies focus their attention 
on the role played by the following three sets of characteristics: economic conditions, crime 
conditions and provision/quality of public services. 
Several papers indicate that attitudes toward local government officials are influenced by 
economic factors. Local governments are rewarded with continued support in moments of 
economic prosperity, whereas they become less popular in periods of economic crisis. 
Hopkins and Pettingill (2017), using data on big-city US mayoral elections between 1990 and 
2011, find that low city-level unemployment relative to national unemployment is associated 
with a higher incumbent vote share. Martins and Veiga (2013) show that in Portugal national 
economic conditions have an effect on municipal electoral outcomes. When the same 
political party governs at national and local levels, the local government is punished if the 
national unemployment rate increases. Additional evidence on the importance of economic 
conditions is provided by Arnold and Carnes (2012) who analyse the determinants of the 
popularity of New York’s mayors. Their work shows that worsening local economic 
5conditions, proxied by an economic misery index, are associated with a decrease in the 
mayors’ approval rating. 
Given that security is often considered by people as one of the most urgent and 
challenging problems our societies are facing today, several papers examine the relationship 
between general safety or crime and local electoral success. Rydgren and Ruth (2010) show 
that in Sweden support for radical right-wing parties is higher in municipalities where crime 
is more likely to occur. Howell and Marshall (1998) find that black’s electorate confidence in 
local black government declined in New Orleans between 1985 and 1994 as a result of rising 
crime rates. Other studies analyse how combating crime and corruption affects mayor’s 
electoral success. McNitt (2010), using data on 19 major US cities between 1820 and 1995, 
concludes that mayors improving law enforcement, which includes facilitating non-routine 
crackdowns on crime and corruption as well as increasing the size and professionalism of 
police forces, serve longer in the office. 
Whilst most previous studies focus on economic and crime conditions, only a few examine 
the role of other aspects of performance. In particular, the service-related dimensions appear 
to be overlooked. One would expect citizens to hold mayors accountable for the quality of 
services they receive. Howell and Perry (2004) show that mayor’s popularity is strongly 
correlated with citizens’ satisfaction about different city services. Burnett and Kogan (2017) 
suggest that the quality of local roads impacts on city elections. Specifically, they show that 
in San Diego pothole complaints have a significantly negative impact on incumbent’s vote 
share. Arceneaux (2006) finds that traffic congestion has an effect on city-level voting 
behaviour (as long as citizens attribute functional responsibility to the city government). 
6Variables, Data Sources and Methodology
In order to analyse the extent to which citizens’ evaluations of mayors respond to changes in 
local conditions, we pool data on 75 cross-sectional units (i.e. big/more populous Italian 
municipalities- see Appendix A for a list of the municipalities considered in this study2), 
along a time span of 6 years (i.e. 2010-2015). Before outlining the model, it is important to 
provide definitions and data sources for all the dependent and independent variables.
Dependent variable
Mayoral approval rating is our dependent variable. Data on this variable come from the 
annual public opinion polls conducted by IPR marketing and published by the financial daily 
newspaper ilSole24ore. They cover all Italian big municipalities and have been held since 
2010. Between 600 and 1,000 citizens are sampled in each municipality between mid-
September and mid-December each year. Respondents are representative of the adult 
population from which they were sampled with respect to (i) gender, (ii) age and (iii) area of 
residence. Data are collected using Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI), 
Computer Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) and Computer Assisted Personal Interview 
(CAPI). Interviewees are asked the following question: “I would like to ask your opinion on 
how the mayor of your municipality has performed during this year. If municipal elections 
were held tomorrow, would you vote against or in favour of the incumbent mayor?“. Mayoral 
approval ratings are only given as a percentage of the respondents who intend to vote in 
favour of the incumbent mayor in each big municipality. Mayor approval in our dataset 
ranges from 38 to 71 percent, with a mean of 53.6 percent. 
7Independent variables
Mayors’ responsibilities are taken into account in selecting the main independent variables of 
the model. In Italy, mayors are chief executives of their respective municipalities. 
Municipality governments are responsible for various services including local police and 
public transportation systems. Additionally, they play an important role in protecting the 
environment, for instance in terms of managing the waste and preserving air quality. 
Our indicator for public transportation is the number of annual passengers using local public 
transport per inhabitant. Although this is a measure capturing the intensity/frequency of 
public transport usage, several papers (Rickwood and Glazebrook 2009; Wang and Liu 2015) 
show that it is strongly related to the quality of services provided. An accessible and reliable 
local public transportation system improves users’ satisfaction and their loyalty and attracts 
new users (Perk, Flynn, and Volinski 2008). Data on our indicator for public transportation 
are available at municipality level, come from the Italian National Statistical Institute 
(ISTAT) and cover the 2010-2015 period (though there are three municipalities with one or 
two missing data points). 
Two different local environmental measures are employed. While the first measure is the 
annual percentage of waste recycled, the second one is the annual average concentration of 
PM103.  Data on the latter come from the National Statistical System (SISTAN), whereas 
data on the former are from the Institute of Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA).  
For both measures data are available at municipality level between 2010 and 2015 (though 
data on the annual average concentration of PM10 are not reported for a few municipalities, 
while for others some years are missing). An independent environmental organization 
(Legambiente) has been conducting a significant campaign in Italy since the mid-2000s in 
8order to increase local community awareness about environmental issues. Among other 
initiatives, Legambiente, in collaboration with IlSole24ore, has been regularly publishing 
information on the environmental performance of all big Italian municipalities with respect to 
several aspects, including waste recycle and air quality. Municipalities are also ranked 
according to the scores received in these aspects.  Importantly, this information receives a lot 
of media attention. Many national and local newspapers as well as television programs 
openly debate about the environmental performance and the ranking of big municipalities. 
The annual number of muggings and pickpocket incidents per 10,000 inhabitants is used in 
an attempt to measure the relationship between general safety and mayoral approval ratings. 
Unfortunately, data on this crime measure are only available at provincial level rather than at 
municipality level. They are from the Ministry of the Interior and are available between 2010 
and 2015. Local police, together with other police forces, are responsible for the maintenance 
of security and public safety in the municipality. 
As shown in the previous Section, despite the fact that locally elected officials have little or 
no power over the economy, it is still possible that economic conditions have a bearing on 
their popularity. Hopkins and Pettingill (2017) argue that economic conditions tend to be 
widely covered by local news outlets. We use two indicators for economic conditions. The 
first indicator is annual real income per capita. Data on this variable come from the Ministry 
of Economics and Finance, are available at municipality level and cover the 2010-2015 
period. The second economic indicator is annual unemployment rate. Data on this variable 
come from ISTAT and cover the 2010-2015 period. They are, however, only available at 
provincial level. Nevertheless, given that all selected municipalities are “big” municipalities 
whose inhabitants make up a substantial part of the population of the province they belong 
9to4, one would expect municipality and provincial unemployment rates to be highly 
correlated5. 
Additionally, although Italian municipalities rely mostly on central government lump-sum 
grants, they may impose a surcharge on personal income tax (addizionale comunale 
sull’Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Fisiche - IRPEF). This municipal tax is included 
among the independent variable of the model in order to investigate whether local taxes affect 
the popularity of mayors. Data on this variable are from the Global Laboratory                                                       
(http://www.globallaboratory.it/pit/addcom/index.html) and cover the 2010-2015 period 
(though they are unavailable for one municipality and there are two municipalities with two 
missing data points). 
Next, some control variables are included in the model to account for the influence that other 
factors may have on mayoral approval rating. 
The percentage of foreign people living in each municipality is employed in an attempt to 
capture the public’s resentment towards immigrants6 in Italy. A substantial proportion of 
Italians consider immigration to be a big problem, though there is significant geographical 
variation in opinions (Genovese, Belgioioso, and Kern 2017), and politicians7 are often 
blamed for not setting up tighter restrictions on it. A survey conducted by the Pew Research 
Center’s Global Attitudes Project in 2009 found that more than 8 out of 10 Italians say that 
“we should restrict and control entry into our country more than we do now” (Horowitz 
2010). Data on the share of foreigners on total population are from ISTAT and are available 
between 2010 and 2015. 
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In line with previous studies, our model comprises also population change among the 
determinants of mayoral approval ratings. However, the expected effect of this factor is 
unclear. On the one hand, Logan and Molotch (1987) note that population growth is a great 
accomplishment for mayors, affecting their career trajectory. On the other hand, McNitt 
(2010) argues that rapid population growth may be associated with a decrease in a mayor’s 
tenure. Data on this variable come from ISTAT and cover the 2010-2015 period.
Finally, we attempt to account for the so-called “honeymoon effect” (Carrion 1998) and 
“coat-tail effect” (Kaplowitz 1971). The rationale behind the first effect is that political 
leaders (including mayors) tend to benefit from a large stock of popularity in the period 
immediately after their election. Grossman and Kumar (1981) argue that this could be driven 
by greater media attention. Arnold and Carnes (2012) provide empirical evidence on the great 
importance of this effect. 
The coat-tail effect refers here to the possibility that the popularity of the Prime Minster rubs 
off on the mayors who are affiliated to the same political party/coalition. This may happen 
when individuals show different levels of involvement for different levels of government. 
Some people, who pay more attention on the way the national government handles national 
problems relative to how local politicians deal with sub-national issues, may believe that the 
Prime Minister is doing a great job, and this opinion may positively affect their perception of 
the performance of other lower-level political leaders of the same party/coalition. Scroop 
(2002) argues that, following September 11th, the war on terrorism conducted by President 
Bush had the potential to produce a coat-tail effect; that Bush’s personal popularity could 
spill over to Republican candidates at the state and local levels. 
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Model specification
Following the approach of Arnold and Carnes (2012), we estimate a first-difference model. 
Changes in approval are related to changes in our independent variables. The following 
model is used for the estimation:
ΔY = β0 +  β1 Δnumber of passengers using public transport + β2 Δpercentage of waste 
recycled + β3 Δconcentration of PM10 in the air + β4 Δnumber of muggings and pickpocket 
incidents + β5 Δincome per capita + β6 Δunemployment rate + β7 Δsurcharge on personal 
income tax + β8 Δpercentage of foreigners + β9 Δpopulation + β10 honeymoon effect + β11 
coat-tail effect + µ
where Y is the dependent variable, mayoral approval rating, and Δ denotes year-to-year 
changes in the variables. Honeymoon effect is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there 
was a change in mayor’s office, 0 otherwise. Coat-tail effect is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if, during the relevant period, the mayor was affiliated to the same political 
party/coalition of the Prime Minister, 0 otherwise. The error term is µ. 
An important advantage of this first-difference model is that time-invariant determinants of 
approval cancel out. This reduces the misspecification problem as a result of omitted variable 
bias deriving from unobserved characteristics that remain constant over time. This includes, 
for instance, determinants of mayoral approval ratings that vary across municipalities but are 
constant over time. An additional advantage of the first-difference model is that it is less 
likely to violate some ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions. First-difference variables 
are more likely to be stationary than absolute level variables. Furthermore, the first-difference 
model is less likely to suffer from the residuals autocorrelation problem (Longhi and Nandi 
2015). 
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Year-to-year dummies are added to the independent variables of our model in order to 
account for the effect of national factors on mayoral approval. Specifically, national level 
economic conditions such as inflation and evolution of government debt have been shown to 
affect electoral outcomes. Veiga and Veiga (2010) conclude that macroeconomic variables 
exert a considerable influence on voting in Portugal. Since year-to-year dummies pick up the 
effect of factors uniformly affecting all cross-sectional units over time, they basically capture 
the average effect of omitted macro-variables (Elinder 2010).
Results
Table 1 presents the OLS estimates for our model. Standard errors have been clustered at 
municipality level in all regressions to account for within-municipality correlation in errors. 
Given that, as mentioned earlier, data on the 2010-2015 period are not available for all our 
independent variables, estimates are reported for three different specifications. We start with 
a specification that includes the independent variables with no missing data points. Therefore, 
Column 1 presents results when measures for economic and crime conditions, population, 
share of foreigners on total population, our proxy for  waste management and indicators for 
the honeymoon and coat-tail effects are all included in the model. The other three 
independent variables are progressively introduced in the next two specifications. In Column 
2 we add to the specification our proxy for public transportation. Results for the full 
specification, which also includes our indicators for air quality and local taxes, are shown in 
Column 3. Finally, in Column 4 we employ the same specification as in Column 3 but with 
lower-quality data for the concentration of PM10 in the air8. One should note that the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is always below 10, suggesting that these independent 
variables pose no collinearity problems in running regression analysis (Myers 1990). 
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Insert Table 1 about here
Looking at the estimates shown in Column 1, one may observe that the coefficients on both 
our economic variables are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. However, while 
the coefficient on unemployment rate9 has the expected negative sign, the sign of the 
coefficient on income per capita is not in line with expectations. Additionally, our estimates 
show that there is no statistically significant relationship between changes in mayor approval 
ratings and changes in the number of muggings and pickpocket incidents. The size of the 
coefficient on our crime indicator is very small and its sign is also unexpectedly positive. 
Similarly, changes in population are not associated with changes in mayoral approval. The 
coefficients on the percentage of waste recycled and share of foreigners on total population 
have the expected signs (positive and negative, respectively), but are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.
We also find that there is no significant effect on approval when mayors are affiliated to the 
same political party/coalition of the Prime Minister. Perhaps this result is partially driven by 
the fact that between November 2011 and April 2013 technocrat Mario Monti served as 
Prime Minister in the wake of the Italian debt crisis. On the other hand, the results indicate 
that people award some sort of honeymoon to newly elected mayors. Mayors are found to 
enjoy a nearly 7 percentage point boost in approval during the year in which they were first 
elected.
Moving on to the estimates reported in Column 2 of Table 1, one may note that the 
coefficient on our measure for public transportation is positive and statistically significant. 
An increase in the number of passengers using local public transport per inhabitant is 
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associated with higher approval ratings. This result would seem to suggest that mayors’ 
popularity is influenced by the extent to which people use local public transport. Local public 
transportation is one of the most important city services as it is a daily feature on many 
citizens’ life. Our findings are consistent with those of a report carried out by ISTAT (2013) 
showing that there is a strong relationship between the quality of public transport and 
confidence in the municipal government. More specifically, a quantitative model suggests 
that switching from a high quality public urban transport system (measured by a score 
between 8 and 10 out of 10) to a low quality public urban transport system (measured by a 
score between 0 and 5 out of 10) increases the likelihood of obtaining a low score in terms of 
confidence in the municipal government by 75 percent. A good local public transportation 
system is likely to be especially appreciated by people living in very big municipalities where 
their ability to get around is increasingly hampered due to traffic problems. 
When looking at the results shown in Column 3 of Table 1, one can see that the coefficient on 
our measure for air quality has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. An increase in the average concentration of PM10 in the air is correlated with lower 
approval ratings. Such a finding would appear to indicate that many citizens are concerned 
about pollution in the air that they breathe and consider important for city leaders to commit 
to environmental protection. This may reflect people’s increased awareness about the adverse 
effects of air pollution on health. Our results are in line with those of a recent Eurobarometer 
survey (European Commission 2017) showing that Italians are among the EU citizens most 
concerned about air pollution and how this environmental issue may affect them personally. 
A large majority of Italians think that air quality has deteriorated in their country in the past 
ten years and want more to be done to protect the environment. The environmental problem is 
especially severe in many big cities that have difficulties in meeting air quality standards 
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most likely as a result of traffic congestion. On the other hand, the coefficient on our 
indicator for local taxes has not the expected sign and is not statistically significant. The 
surcharge on personal income tax has not been changed by a large number of municipalities 
in the period considered here. Additionally, the tax rate is pretty low (up to 0.8 percent). 
Estimates presented in Column 4 are very close to those shown in Column 3. The coefficient 
on our proxy for public transportation is practically unchanged and remains significant. The 
coefficient on the concentration of PM10 in the air has still a negative sign and is still 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  
Next, we re-estimate our model using different indicators for economic and crime conditions. 
Crime rate is now proxied by the number of homicides per 10,000 inhabitants10. Although 
muggings and pickpocket incidents are obviously much more frequent than homicides, it is 
possible that the latter may especially attract people’s attention given their wide television 
and press coverage. Inflation rate11 is employed as an alternative measure for economic 
conditions. In Columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table 2 we replicate the estimates of Columns 1, 2 and 3 
of Table 1, replacing our economic and crime indicators with inflation rate and the number of 
homicides per 10,000 inhabitants, respectively. In Column 2 of Table 2 we use the same 
specification as in Column 1, but we also add to the independent variables unemployment 
rate and an interaction between this factor and inflation rate. 
Insert Table 2 about here
Estimates reported in Table 2 are largely consistent with those shown in Table 1. Economic 
and crime conditions do not appear to matter. While the coefficients on our economic and 
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crime measures are consistently found to have the expected sign (excluding the above 
interaction term), none of them turn out to be statistically significant at conventional levels. 
On the other hand, the results confirm the statistically significant relationship between 
mayoral approval ratings and indicators on local public transportation and air quality. The 
honeymoon effect is also robust to the inclusion of alternative indicators for economic and 
crime conditions. 
Given that the estimates of Tables 1 and 2 consistently suggest that mayors’ popularity is 
associated with performance indicators on local public transportation and air quality, it is 
interesting to investigate whether this result is driven by very big municipalities. As argued 
above, public transportation and air quality may be particularly valued by citizens of densely 
populated areas like major cities. These areas are likely to severely suffer from both traffic 
congestion and pollution. In order to test this hypothesis, in Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3 we 
replicate the estimates of Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 1 excluding from the sample 
municipalities whose population is over 500,000 (i.e. Milan, Naples, Turin, Palermo and 
Genoa). The coefficient on the number of passengers using local public transport per 
inhabitant and that on the concentration of PM10 in the air are no longer statistically different 
from zero. The coefficient on our measure for public transportation even has an unexpected 
negative sign. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that once very big 
municipalities are removed from the sample, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between mayor approval ratings and our objective performance indicators on public 
transportation and air quality.
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On the other hand, the honeymoon effect is still found to be statistically significant and 
substantively large. Mayors are found to have a honeymoon with the public in densely and 
less densely populated areas during the period immediately after their election. 
Insert Table 3 about here
Discussion and Conclusions
Using data on 75 big Italian municipalities between 2010 and 2015, this paper has 
investigated the extent to which citizens’ evaluations of mayors are affected by changes in 
local conditions. Local economic and crime indicators are not found to be related to mayoral 
approval ratings. This result is robust to several alternative measures of economic and crime 
conditions. Although the reasons for such a finding are unclear, three different explanations 
can be put forward. First, people may be unable or unwilling to update their political 
preferences based on evaluations of economic and crime performances (Key 1966; Fiorina 
1981). This is because these evaluations tend to be strongly influenced by pre-existing 
political opinions. As suggested by the psychological literature, there is a strong tendency for 
individuals to accept information as true only if it is in line with their own prior beliefs, 
whereas they reject or counterargue information that does not confirm their prior beliefs 
(Kunda 1990; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979). Similarly, it is also possible that people’s 
perceptions about local economic and crime conditions are different from actual 
performances because of biased information provided by the media and governments. 
Second, citizens may not hold mayors accountable for issues that they feel are beyond 
mayors’ control such as economic and crime conditions. Citizens may believe that this is 
mainly the responsibility of the central government. Italy’s economy has considerably 
worsened since 2007 and citizens are unlikely to hold mayors responsible for such a 
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prolonged period of crisis. Similarly, although mayors manage local police, there are many 
circumstances where there is little they can do to increase public safety. For instance, in the 
South of Italy there is a significant and historically rooted presence of organized crime of 
mafia type (Daniele and Marani 2011), and mayors clearly do not have the resources to deal 
with this problem alone. Third, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that our results 
are driven by the use of crude measures for local economic and crime conditions. Data on the 
large majority of these indicators are, unfortunately, only available at provincial level rather 
than at municipality level. Finally, one should also observe that our result is consistent with 
that of several papers concluding that local crime and economic conditions do not matter for 
the approval of local political leaders. Sarprieto (2014), using data on 278 Portuguese 
mainland municipalities for the 1976-2009 period, finds that local economic conditions 
(proxied by unemployment rate and per capita purchasing power) have no impact on the 
mayor’s re-election prospects. Heberlig et al. (2017), employing data on 104 US cities with 
populations over 160,000 between 1992 and 2012, conclude that income growth is unrelated 
to the mayor’s chances of being re-elected. Park and Norpoth (2016) look at the determinants 
of governor approval in Arizona and find that the coefficient on crime is insignificant in 
every model specification. 
 
Our estimates suggest that citizens give higher levels of approval to mayors of municipalities 
where more people use public transport. Public transport is especially relevant in Italy where 
people travel long distances daily. Using data from the Eurobarometer survey, Legambiente 
finds that Italians travel the longest daily distance (i.e. 41 Km) in Europe12.  Evidence that 
Italians care a lot about public transportation emerges also from surveys conducted in big 
cities. For instance, a survey suggests that in Rome about 40 percent of the population 
consider public transportation as one of the top priorities of the municipality13. 
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There is a negative relationship between mayoral approval ratings and the concentration of 
PM10 in the air. This is consistent with the findings of an ISTAT survey (ISTAT 2012) 
where many respondents indicate atmospheric pollution as the most important environmental 
concern Italy is facing today and state that environmental protection should be ensured by 
institutions. It is also possible that increased media coverage on environmental problems has 
made citizens more likely to correctly attribute responsibility to mayors (Mortensen 2013)
While local indicators on public transportation and air quality are found to be related to 
mayors’ popularity, further analysis shows that this result is driven by very big municipalities 
(i.e. those with a population over 500,000). This is not particularly surprising given that 
major cities are the ones most likely to be plagued by traffic congestion and air pollution. Not 
only are these issues responsible for poor air quality, but an effective public transportation 
system is a necessity for many people living in these cities. 
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Notes
1. This is very important as citizens may have dismal levels of awareness of who delivers 
which services (de Benedictis-Kessner 2016). 
2.  Between 2010 and 2015 there were 110 big municipalities in Italy. However, during this 
period annual data on mayoral approval are consistently available only for 75 of them.  
3. PM10 is fine particles stemming from combustion within car engines, solid-fuel 
combustion in households, industrial activities (such as building, mining, manufacturing of 
cement, ceramics and bricks, and smelting), quarrying and mining.
4. All municipalities considered in this study are capitals of the provinces that take the same 
names. For instance, the province of Milan is composed by several municipalities whose the 
most important/the biggest one is the municipality of Milan.
5. To support this argument, we correlate data on unemployment rate among individuals aged 
15-64 for the municipality of Milan between 2004 and 2011 
(http://www.datiopen.it/it/opendata/Comune_di_Milano_Indicatori_occupazione_per_anno_e
_genere_et_15_64_) with similar data for the province of Milan. The value of the correlation 
coefficient is very high, i.e. 0.91. 
6. Using data on 20 countries between 2002 and 2012, Hatton (2016) shows that pro-
immigration opinion is negatively related to the share of immigrants in the population.  
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7. Politicians at all levels of the government are somehow involved in the handling of the 
immigration issue given that the Italian government has increasingly attempted to share the 
burden of immigration across different regions, provinces and municipalities.
8. In an attempt to gain a slightly bigger sample size, we replace some of the missing 
observations by linear interpolation for those municipalities for which there are two or more 
years of data available.
9. It is important to note that in our analysis there is no point in using an alternative 
unemployment rate measure such as the difference between changes in local (provincial) 
unemployment rate and changes in national unemployment rate. This is because the inclusion 
of year-to-year dummies allows us to account for any variation between local and national-
level variables. Additionally, F-statistic values (available upon request) show that in all 
regressions year-to-year dummies are jointly statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
This indicates that, as expected, national level variables (i.e. capturing factors changing 
across years that influence all municipalities equally) do affect mayor’s popularity. 
10. Data on this variable are available between 2010 and 2015 only at provincial level and 
come from the Ministry of the Interior.
11. Data on this variable are only available at provincial level, cover the 2010-2015 period, 
and are from ISTAT. However, these data are not reported for several municipalities, while 
for others some years are missing.  Some researchers (see, among others, Kernell 1978) argue 
that inflation rate has the potential to have more bearing on approval ratings than 
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unemployment rate. This is because while unemployment affects a sub-group of the 
population, inflation impacts the whole population. 
12. http://www.travelnostop.com/news/trasporti/trasporti-pubblici-maglia-nera-per-gli-
italiani_53113 (Accessed 19 April, 2017).
13. http://www.ecodallecitta.it/notizie/384738/eurobarometro-roma-ultima-in-classifica-tra-
le-capitali-per-qualita-della-vita (Accessed 5 June, 2017).
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